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THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY DRAMA.
BY VICTOR S. YARROS.
AS intelligent observers are aware, the w^orld has been witnessing
- a dramatic "race between war and revolution" in several coun-
tries. The war is practically over, but the revolution is far from
having been liquidated. As the aftermath of the great and tragic
war we have many grave and complex problems that may give our
statesmen and jurists more trouble than they have apparently bar-
gained for. The mere setting up of small and restless nationalities
in the independent or "sovereign" business of government is a
holiday task beside the infinitely more difficult task of insuring
reasonable harmony among them and preventing them from pick-
ing quarrels with more powerful neighbors. Small, ambitious nations
can become big nuisances. Federation, union for large purposes,
cooperation in the interest of efficiency and economy, with ample
cultural autonomy for constituent units, would appear to be the
only real solution of the many national and racial problems that the
war has left us as its heritage.
That the minds of sober students and earnest informed think-
ers would naturally turn toward this solution, can hardly be doubted.
The lessons of history, assuredly, are too plain to be misunderstood.
There is no progress in disunion, disintegration, multiplication of
w€ak, insecure states. There are no advantages to true civilization
in reversion to a dead past. Even a League of Nations formed on
the most liberal lines would afford no guaranty of peace and secur-
ity were the newly liberated nationalities to remain severally in-
dependent, jealous of one another, walled in and legally isolated
in a commercial sense. As Immanuel Kant pointed out long ago,
a true League of Nations implies, among other things, complete
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freedom of trade among the associated nations. Tariffs, and espe-
cially preferential tariffs, are sources of irritation and friction, and
a multiplication of independent states necessarily involves a multi-
plication of tariff barriers and customs houses.
These ideas, to repeat, would meet with little resistance from
men of vision and understanding if the world situation were not so
befogged and if confusion were not made worse confounded by
the revolutionary outbreaks and disturbances.
Peace has to be made, not with stable and duly constituted
governments, but, in some cases at least, with fragile, unrepresen-
tative pseudo-governmental organizations—accidents of the hour,
fruits of anarchy and chaos.
Furthermore, the world finds itself in the midst not merely of
political, but of social, economic and intellectual upheavals. No
wonder pessimism is said to reign in high circles, despite the rather
sudden ending of the war.
Now, Russia was the first of the great powers to stop fighting,
sue for peace and embark upon a colossal "social" experiment. Her
internal troubles and trials since the first of the two revolutions of
1917 have perplexed the Western world more deeply than those
of any other country. Many have frankly "given Russia up," say-
ing that her "psychology" is bizarre and utterly incomprehensible
to a non-Slav mind. But we have to understand Russia—especially
we Americans, who are to be called on to aid her materially and
possibly give her sympathetic guidance as well.
In point of fact, the several acts of the Russian drama are not
very difficult to interpret in the light of Russian conditions—phys-
ical, political, moral, and historical. Science bids us look for "simple
explanations," particularly where human conduct is concerned. This
article is an attempt to interpret the Russian revolution and its
sequel without bias, partisanship or passion, and incidentally to
throw light on the question of our duty and opportunity in Russia.
1. The Overthrozv of Csarism.
All Russian writers of note agree that the revolution of March,
1917, was truly national, spontaneous and popular. For the first
time Russians of all schools and factions found themselves "unan-
imous." Autocracy had committed suicide. The old regime was
bankrupt, and there were none to defend it or plead for a new lease
of life for it. Even the peasant millions who had venerated the
"White Czar," the "little father," and had long considered him to
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be their sincere if impotent protector, were reconciled to the abdi-
cation of the House of Romanov and to the estabhshment of a
repubhc. Famine, cold, misery, staggering losses in the war—losses
attributed not to the ordinary fortunes of war, but to incompetence,
corruption, selfishness, pettiness, and actual treachery in the Russian
bureaucracy and cabinet—had thoroughly cured even the illiterate
peasant of his affection for the autocrat. The army welcomed the
revolution. It was weary of butchery and slaughter. Too often
had it had to oppose with bare breasts and arms the irresistible ad-
vance of disciplined, perfectly equipped and ably led enemy legions.
The army knew that Russia could not continue to play the part that
had been assigned to her. She had made terrific sacrifices and had
reached the breaking point. An agricultural empire, with an illit-
erate people, undeveloped "pigmy" industries, a small and ignorant
middle class, inadequate transportation facilities, empty arsenals,
how could Russia stay longer in a war that taxed to the utmost all
the technical, industrial and scientific resources of the twentieth
century ?
The revolution, then, came because Russia needed and de-
manded peace and bread. The masses of the people were not inter-
ested in mere politics : as has well been said, the Russian people
do not "think politically, but economically." The first provisional
government was expected to grant the people the blessings the czar
had been unable to give
—
peace and bread. It was, however, un-
equal to the situation. It lacked moral authority. It was too con-
servative and moderate for the period. It had not the courage to
inform its foreign allies in positive terms that Russia was practically
out of the war and that the renewed "ofifensive" expected of her
was impossible.
The first provisional government was a government of gentle-
men, of cultivated and westernized men, of professors, diplomats
and administrators. The workmen, the soldiers, the sailors, and
the peasants in the villages were not in the mood to listen to the
gospel which this government preached,—the gospel of patience.
of moderation, of sweet reasonableness, of loyalty to allies, of strict
observance of covenants that had been made by the czar. They in-
sisted on immediate relief and reform. The provisional govern-
ment undertook many admirable things, but it could not give the
people peace or bread. It begged for time, and begged in vain.
The real power was in the hands of the militant, mercurial com-
mittees of soldiers, sailors and workmen, and these committees
distrusted the provisional government and hampered it in every
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direction. They soon made the position of the government unten-
able, and it had to resign. It had to make way for a more radical
and more representative government.
2. The Kerensky Cabinets.
After the fall of the Lvov government the central council of
soldiers' and workmen's delegates had the opportunity to take the
reins of government into its own hands. It hesitated and declined.
It professed its readiness to support another coalition cabinet and
work with it so far as it might approve of its policies. Kerensky
was the logical choice for premier in a new cabinet. He was a
socialist, a popular orator, a favorite with the trade unions, a
former agitator against autocracy. Even moderates urged him to
take the premiership. He was not a man of action or of mental
vigor. He was not a statesman or an administrator. But he had
personal magnetism, and it was hoped that he would by persuasive
oratory and tactful private negotiations manage to induce socialists,
individualist radicals and liberals to work together amicably and
preserve a semblance of discipline and order in the army and in the
country.
Kerensky was obliged to make many successive changes in his
cabinet. He sought to placate the extremists without alienating the
moderates. He played the ungrateful role—doubly ungrateful in
Russia, where compromise is treated as sin—of opportunist and
Fabian. His chief duty was to pave the way for a constituent
assembly. He and his associates did not feel that they had any legal
or moral right to settle momentous, knotty and serious cjuestions
—
least of all the question of land tenure. They knew the peasants'
attitude toward the land question. They knew that immediate ex-
propriation of landlords without compensation was a popular doc-
trine, and that this doctrine was being disseminated by a section of
the Social Democratic party of Russia—the Bolshevikis (who have
become so notorious since). But they would not or could not use
force against these agitators—even when some of the latter were
openly accused of accepting enemy money and carrying on propa-
ganda that happened for the moment to suit enemy purposes. The
Kerensky government argued that free speech and free assembly
were too sacred and inviolable to the revolution to be infringed
upon even in a critical and anxious hour. They were determined to
be consistent and logical. They would not do the cruel things
which they had condemned the czar for doing. The agitation thev
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would not, and perhaps could not, check, the agitation of the ex-
tremists who talked to the peasants and soldiers in terms they could
understand, finally proved to be the undoing of the Kerensky gov-
ernment. It fell because it was too conservative for the left and
too radical for the rightist parties. It fell because it was feeble,
uncertain, divided against itself, and practically impotent. Like its
predecessor, it had failed to give the masses either peace or bread.
It had failed to summon a constituent assembly, and it had failed
to impress the Allies with the desirability of encouraging the move-
ment for "a negotiated peace," of promoting inter-belligerent con-
ferences of radicals, laborites and socialists, and formulating definite
peace terms. Kerensky was not as frank with the Allies as he might
have been, and it is doubtful whether they ever fully understood the
Russian situation before the victory of Bolshevism. On the other
hand there is reason to think that the Allies resisted unpleasant
explanations and shrank from looking the facts in the face so far
as Russia was concerned. They thought that a Kornilov, or another
stalwart patriot and soldier, could suppress revolutionary pacifism
and reestablish the eastern front. They stressed Kerensky 's weak-
ness too much, and could not bring themselves to believe that ele-
mental forces, beyond the control of any "strong man," had been
unchained and kt loose in Russia. They mistook a mass movement
for an insignificant revolt. They indicted individuals for acts or
omissions which, at the time and in the circumstances that existed,
could not possibly have been avoided. Russia after the revolution
was out of the war and intended to stay out. Even the Cossacks
refused to support a pro-Ally, pro-Patriotic movement.
3. TJic Bolshcz'ik Dictatorship.
Lenin, Trotzky and their associates—none of them "workmen"
—had little difficulty in wresting power from the Kerensky govern-
ment. They did not lead the masses—they followed them ; they
voiced the people's insistent demands for peace, bread and land.
They had audacity and the courage of their opinions. They were
Social Democrats, followers of Karl Marx, and they subscribed to
the economic interpretation of history, or. "historic materialism."
They had no respect for what they called "bourgeois shibboleths."
They had no interest in political ideals and cared little about mere
forms of government. Religion and morality meant nothing to them
;
the social revolution would bring forth its own religion and morality.
They believed in the gospel of the Communist Manifesto, did not
flinch from expropriation and confiscation of property, and w^ere
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prepared to use any ni^ans that might prove to be necessary to the
reahzation of their supreme end.
Their first duty, as they rightly enough conceived it, was to
end the war and give Russia the opportunity of turning to internal
problems and revolutionary reforms. They did not prefer a sep-
arate peace ; they served what to them seemed quite sufficient notice
on the Allies that a general peace must be made forthwith on the
basis of the Soviet formula, "No annexations ; no indemnities ; self-
determination." They gave the Allies time, while warning them
repeatedly that Russia might be compelled to desert them and con-
clude a separate peace.
They expected that the German Socialists and trade unionists
would come to their aid in the final phase of the peace negotiations
and force the Berlin government and the German high command to
grant Russia fair and reasonable terms. They did much to shape
and influence labor sentiment in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and
they expected to reap immediately the fruits of their bold and thrilling
ideas. They thought they had so thoroughly prepared the soil of
Europe for revolution that even the German kaiser and his generals
would not dare propose to Russia's Socialist government oppressive
and humiliating terms.
When they finally signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty they did so
because the anticipated help was not forthcoming and because they
felt sure that revolution in Western Europe was only delayed. They
signed a treaty that, they said, gave them a breathing spell, a chance
to organize a "red" army, and the infinitely more important oppor-
tunity of abolishing the old economic order and establishing genuine
socialism in what remained of the Russian empire. They candidly
said that they could afford to give up Poland, the Ukraine, the
Baltic provinces, and much more besides, for an uncertain period,
provided they were left free to make their historic experiment in
Marxian socialism in the interior of Great Russia.
The Bolshevik leaders called their successful rebellion against
Kerensky and his coalition cabinet "the social revolution." They
planned to expropriate the expropriators, to seize the land, the
mines, the banks, the factories and the other capitalistic establish-
ments, and to transfer these to the people. They did not actually
believe that the peasant and proletarian masses were "conscious
Socialists," converts to Marxian socialism; but they believed that
the people's sufferings and discontent, and the peasants' land hunger,
would enable them to take advantage of the situation. They meant,
in short, to use the irresistible demand for peace and bread as a
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stalking horse for the introduction of the type of SociaHsm they had
long advocated and dreamed of.
But what of the middle classes, of the non-socialist parties and
groups, of the milder socialists who were opposed to confiscation,




the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin
and Trotzky declared that all the counter-revolutionaries, whether
noble, bourgeois or former foes of the czar and his regime, would
be ruthlessly suppressed. The rule of the people was the goal in
view ; but the rule of the urban proletariat, led by a few Marxian
socialist intellectuals, was the indispensable preliminary stage. His-
tory justified the dictatorship, they claimed. Revolutions cannot be
peaceful or beatific. Sentimentalists, rhetoricians, academics, fair-
weather radicals were as dangerous to them as "the reactionary Bour-
bons. All enemies must be crushed. There could be no compromise
with weak-kneed reformers. Past services and claims must be
treated as negligible factors. The success of the social revolution
must not be jeopardized by ideology or weak concessions to "bour-
geois virtues." Russia was the pioneer, the pathfinder, and at any
cost must achieve the great objective. The other nations would
follow in her footsteps. Russia was not perhaps cjuite ready for
socialism, but there are such things as "leaps" in the history of
human progress. The minority was ready for the leap, and once
made, there could be no turning back. The majority would subse-
quently be educated and converted.
The group of masterful men that held these beliefs assumed
power with the support of armed guards, embattled urban workmen,
and hosts of disinherited and vindictive peasants who had not for-
gotten the cruelties of the ancien regime, the burdens of the czar's
tax system, the exactions of the corrupt officials and the tyrannical
agents of the secret police. The Soviets throughout Great Russia
gravitated toward Bolshevism, for it meant little, if any, interference
with them and immediate seizure of the land that belonged to
nobles, capitalists, the church or the crown. A reign of terror en-
sued. Every "bourgeois" was under suspicion. How many men,
women, and children the Bolshevik regime has slain or starved to
death, the world does not yet know. But that anarchy and civil war
have held sway throughout Russia, and that Bolshevik troops have
had to fight whole sections of the dismembered empire, are notorious
facts.
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4. The Bolshevik Failure—the Causes.
At this writing the Bolshevik government is still nominally in
the saddle, but its collapse is foreseen and generally anticipated.
Even Lenin tacitly admits that his great adventure is likely to end
in smoke. He has not brought internal peace to Russia. He has
not restored normal conditions. He has not averted famine and
has not started the wheels of industry. The "leap" has not been
made. Ukases and decrees on paper are not enough to carry a
people over a chasm and settle them securely under a new system of
laws and institutions.
Why Lenin and Trotzky have failed, and were bound to fail,
may be explained in a few words. In the first place, they did not
give the people the external peace they had promised. The treaty
of Brest-Litovsk angered many Russians, who continued to regard
Germany as an enemy. Moreover, it brought them the Czecho-
slovak complications and, eventually, intervention by the Allies and
the United States.
In the second place, the Bolshevik government did not bring
internal peace, concord and rehabilitation. Province after province,
district and center after district and center seceded, repudiated the
Lenin regime. Some districts set up other governments and opened
negotiations with the Allies. Russian exiles in Europe and America
carried on active propaganda against Bolshevism and Soviet rule,
denouncing them as tyrannical beyond anything ever attempted by
the czar, utterly anti-democratic and hopelessly incompetent and
"crazy." In the parts of Russia which the Bolshevik executive
claimed to control and govern every former landlord, including the
richer peasants, every former owner of property, every "bour-
geois," and nearly every non-socialist intellectual was known to be
bitterly anti-Bolshevik at heart. Thousands of trained men went
on a strike and declined to work under the mediocre or ignorant
appointees of the Bolshevik Soviets. This led to reprisals, to "pog-
roms" directed against the intellectuals. Russia could not resume
normal life without the energetic and earnest aid of every intelligent
son and daughter. True, these educated and trained men and
women numerically constitute an insignificant element of the whole
population ; still, as Lenin has admitted, Russia cannot produce,
trade, exchange, transport, finance her industries and commerce
without this small element. If it is striking against and boycotting
Bolshe^'ist rule, that rule must collapse.
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And what after such a collapse? The answer of anti-Bolshevik
Russians of all schools and parties is that the Bolshevik ministry
must be replaced by a truly national, representative government, and
that a constituent assembly should be convoked without further
delay to give Russia a stable and genuinely democratic government.
This is the alternative program. A constituent assembly elected
under a system of universal, equal and secret suffrage would have
the authority to speak for Russia and to act for her. No dictator
has such authority, no matter how benevolent and altruistic and self-
sacrificing he may be—or imagine himself to be.
5. Is the Soviet System ''Superior"?
There are, however, men and women in England and America
who assert that the Bolsheviki are more democratic than their oppo-
nents ; that they have evolved a higher form or type of popular
government ; that the attacks on them betray narrow, provincial,
prejudiced minds, and that, even if they fail, the future is bound
to vindicate them. It is asserted that Europe and America have
crude, outworn, unjust systems of government, while Bolshevism
has blazed the way to a fairer and nobler form. Let us examine
these claims. Let us ask just on what basis of fact or principle they
rest. What is the essence of the Soviet form of government?
Let Lenin himself, the acknowledged intellectual leader of Bol-
shevism, answer this query. In an elaborate and powerful address
which he delivered at Moscow some months ago Lenin said on this
crucial point:
"We introduced and firmly established the Soviet republic—
a
new type of state—infinitely higher and more democratic than the
best of the bourgeois-parliamentary republics. We established the
dictatorship of the proletariat, supported by the poorest peasantry,
and have inaugurated a comprehensively planned system of socialist
reform."
These two sentences, if they mean anything, mean that a dic-
tatorship of the city workers supported by the poorest peasants is
infinitely higher and more democratic than a republic based on uni-
versal, equal and secret suft'rage, on the doctrine of majority rule
arrived at by free and tolerant discussion. What reasonable radical
can subscribe to this notion?
In the same address Lenin continues, more explicitly
:
"The Socialist character of the Soviet democracy consists first
in this : that the electorate comprises the toiling and exploited
masses ; the bourgeoisie is excluded. Secondly in this : that all
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bureaucratic formalities and limitations of elections are done away
with ; that the masses themselves determine the order and time of
elections and with complete freedom of call. Thirdly, that the best
possible mass organization of the vanguard of the toilers—of the
industrial proletariat—is formed, enabling them to direct the ex-
ploited masses, to attract them to active participation in political
life, to train them politically through their own experience ; that in
this way a beginning is made, for the first time, to get actually the
whole population to learn how to manage and begin managing."
In other words, the Soviet form of democracy is higher and
better because it disfranchises the middle class, because it disfran-
chises the richer peasant who shares the sentiments of the middle
class, and because it puts supreme control in the hands of the city
workers. Further, the Soviet form is higher and better because it
dispenses with all formalities in elections and enables a mass meet-
ing, or a tyrannical chairman pounding a gavel, to declare this or
that group of persons elected to this or that set of offices. Secrecy,
uniformity, precautions against fraud and force in elections are
"bourgeois" fancies, and their abandonment insures more certain
and direct rule by the people
!
Of course, all this is grotesquely absurd. Yet there are self-
styled radicals and progressi\'es who extol the Soviet type of "de-
mocracy" and ask us to copy it. or at least devoutly worship it as an
ideal, if we are too imperfect to realize it.
The Soviit form of government is neither democratic nor ra-
tional. It is government by accidental groups, by disorderly assem-
blies, by haphazard arrangements. It is government by usurpers
and pretenders who may or may not choose to obey a dictatorship
of the so-called proletariat, which in turn is led by a small group
of remorseless non-proletarian dogmatists and social bigots.
Some superficial apologists for the Lenin regime find some
hidden beauties in the fact that the Soviet government, whether
local, provincial or central, is a government of people who "work
together" instead of a government of people who happen to live in a
given area or who think alike ! Now there may be some advantage
in basing representation on occupation, profession, calling, instead
of on mere population. But what has this to do with the disfran-
chisement of those who "work together" as "richer peasants," or
as "bourgeois," or as non-socialist intellectuals? And what hap-
pens when those who work together disagree and think separately?
In point of fact, the Lenin form of Soviet government is a despotic
government of certain people who think alike and who disfranchise
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and suppress all who venture to differ with them and to have other
ideas of social and economic organization. It is not a higher form
of democracy, but a lower form of tyranny.
Russia had such institutions as the Mir—the village commune
—
the Zemstvo. and the city electorate to build on. The czar's suffrage
acts were illiberal and undemocratic, and the revolution extended
and popularized them. Proportional representation was adopted to
protect minorities. Local, provincial and national institutions could
have been firmly planted on the thoroughly democratized suffrage,
and the majority would have ruled within constitutional limitations.
The r)olshe\ik faction destroyed democracy, scornfully rejected
majority rule, and established a dictatorship of a small class in the
name of "the social revolution" that was to bring forth a perfect
democracy. The experiment was as indefensible theoretically as it
was futile, needless and impossible practically. In Russia, under a
democratic government, the workers and peasants would have con-
trolled any assembly, any parliamentary body. The land problem,
the credit problem, the problem of industrial control, would have
been solved conformably to the Avishes of the great majority
workers and peasants. The minority, the bourgeoisie and the in-
tellectuals would have been outvoted on every definite issue. But
—they would have had the rights of freemen—the right to express
opinions, to agitate and educate, to seek to influence and win over
the majority. They would have had their day in the court of public
opinion. They would have had no ground for complaint. As it
is, th;y are deprived of all political rights, all voice in government,
simply because they might have proved too persuasive, too eloquent,
too successful in debate. Their "side" was not wanted. They could
not be permitted to talk or to vote. The people must follow the
proletariat vanguard and Lenin. They cannot be allowed to choose.
And all this is "higher democracy"
!
These bedlamite id:as have happily been assessed in Germany
and Austria at their true value. The Social Democrats of Western
Europe have fortunately little sympathy with Bolshevism and have
regarded Russia's recent experiences as warnings or deterrent ex-
amples. The principles of democracy and liberty are rightly under-
stood in the radical circles of Germany and Austria, and the danger
of Bolshevism in those countries was greatly exaggerated after the
abdication of the autocrats and the establishment of a provisional
Socialist government. Russia must learn from Europe and America
what democracy is. She is learning now. She is not lost.
